The tension between federalism and national competition policy has come to a head. The state action doctrine finds its basis in principles of federalism, permitting states to replace free competition with alternative regulatory regimes they believe better serve the public interest. Public restraints have a unique ability to undermine the regime of free competition that provides the basis of U.S.-and state-commerce policies. Nevertheless, preservation of federalism remains an important rationale for protecting such restraints. The doctrine has elusive contours, however, which have given rise to circuit splits and overbroad application that threatens to subvert the state action doctrine's dual goals of federalism and competition. The recent Eleventh Circuit decision in FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health System, Inc. epitomizes the concerns associated with misapplication of state action immunity. The U.S. Supreme Court recently granted the FTC's petition for certiorari and now has the opportunity to more clearly define the contours of the doctrine. In Phoebe Putney, the FTC has challenged a merger it claims is the product of a sham transaction, an allegation certain to test the boundaries of the state action doctrine and implicate the interpretation of a two-pronged test designed to determine whether consumer welfarereducing conduct taken pursuant to purported state authorization is immune from antitrust challenge. The FTC's petition for writ of certiorari raises two issues for review. First, it presents the question concerning the appropriate interpretation of foreseeability of anticompetitive conduct. Second, the FTC presents the question whether a passive supervisory role on the state's part can be construed as state action or whether its approval of the merger was a sham. In this paper, I seek to explicate the areas in which the state action doctrine needs clarification and to predict how the Court will decide the case in light of precedent and the principles underlying the doctrine.
INTRODUCTION
The tension between federalism and national competition policy has come to a head. The state action doctrine finds its basis in principles of federalism, permitting states to replace free competition with alternative regulatory regimes they believe better serve the public interest. In many instances, state exemption of certain conduct from the antitrust laws poses greater harm to competition than private price-fixing arrangements, 1 and the resulting decrease in competition is not offset by the achievement of the social benefits the legislatures sought in implementing the exemption. Midcal sought an injunction against the pricing system, alleging the scheme violated the Sherman Act.
14 The Supreme Court, interpreting precedent refining Parker's general doctrine, 15 held that state action required both a clearly articulated state policy and active supervision of that policy's implementation. 16 In Midcal, the state clearly permitted resale price maintenance and therefore satisfied the first of these requirements. 17 The state failed, however, to actively supervise the resale price maintenance; rather than establishing or reviewing the reasonableness of resale prices, the state merely authorized and enforced the prices that private parties established. 18 Essentially, the state declared lawful conduct that ordinarily violates the Sherman Act, 19 an authorization outside the scope of the state action doctrine. 20 Thus, state action immunity did not apply to the program.
The Court later reaffirmed the applicability of state action immunity to private parties in Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States. 21 It also refined the first prong 13 Id. 14 Id. 15 See id. at 104-05; see also New Motor Vehicle Bd. of Cal. V. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96 (1978) (finding state action immunity pursuant to a "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed" goal of displacing unfettered business freedom in the automobile dealership industry); City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978) (finding state action immunity where the state's policymaker actively supervises implementation of the policy); Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976) (a state's passive acceptance of a public utility's tariff did not confer immunity on the utility); Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (distinguishing mere prompting of anticompetitive conduct from direction to engage in it and finding immunity in only the latter circumstance). 16 Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105. 17 Id. 18 Id. 19 At the time the case was decided, resale price maintenance was a per se violation of the Sherman Act. The Court has since eschewed application of the per se rule in favor of the rule of reason. The rule would be contrary to principles of federalism, permitting courts to opine on state policies and to apply a subjective test that asks whether public officials thought their actions were taken in the public interest. 33 The Court also pointed out that Congress has passed other laws designed to combat corruption in state and local governments; the Sherman Act does not create a code of ethics for political activity.
34
The Hallie Court also refined the requirements of the second Midcal prong, finding the active supervision requirement does not apply to actions taken by municipalities (as opposed to private parties) pursuant to state policy. 35 The Court explained that the purpose of the statesupervision requirement is to ensure the action is being taken in furtherance of state policy.
36
Where a government entity is the actor, it is presumed to be pursuing state policy; thus, there is little risk that it is engaging in activity designed for private benefit. 37 Therefore, the Court created a bright-line rule precluding municipalities from the active supervision requirement.
For those subject to the active supervision requirement, the Court explained in FTC v. The conduct involved ratemaking by insurance rating bureaus, which was subject to state review. 42 According to the Supreme Court, two of the states whose programs were being challenged failed to review the ratemaking because they permitted the rates to go into effect unless the state challenged them. 43 That is, a default rule that inaction by the state should be construed as permission to set rates is not adequate supervision. The "vague imprimatur in form and agency inaction in fact" rendered the states' supervision inadequate to satisfy Midcal's standard. In short, more than the mere presence of a supervisory role is needed for state action immunity to apply; active supervision must exist.
The common thread running throughout the Supreme Court's application of state action immunity is the fulfillment of the doctrine's underlying purpose: to promote principles of federalism without unduly sacrificing national competition policy at the discretion of those pursuing private interests. The Court has continually emphasized that it must be sufficiently clear that a state deliberately sacrificed competition in the pursuit of alternative social policies. 64 Hammond, 171 F.3d at 236 (finding important the fact that a monopoly existed at the time of the enactment of the statute analyzed by the Eleventh Circuit and criticizing the Eleventh Circuit's opinion as "skating close to an overly lax view of the necessity of expressed legislative will").
To infer a policy to displace competition from, for example, authority to enter into joint ventures or other business forms would stand federalism on its head. A state would henceforth be required to disclaim affirmatively antitrust immunity, at the peril of creating an instrument of local government with power the state did not intend to grant. 65 Similarly, inferring immunity from the mere grant of other ordinary corporate powers would disserve principles of federalism as well as competition policy.
66
Courts have also disagreed in interpreting the active supervision requirement. The Supreme Court has broadly outlined the requirements for active supervision, 67 but it has never articulated the precise contours of the requirement. 68 It is clear, however, that its purpose is to ensure state authorization to engage in a given activity is actually being used in the public's interest and is therefore attributable to the state itself. 79 The structure of the acquisition implicated Georgia's Hospital Authorities Law, which in turn, created a hospital authority with "broad powers to meet the public health needs of its community." 80 The structure of the transaction is a relatively important feature of the analysis. The Hospital Authority of Albany-Dougherty County ("Authority") leases Phoebe Putney Memorial Hospital ("Memorial")
to Phoebe Putney Memorial Hospital, Inc. ("PPMH"); the lease authorizes PPMH to set prices for Memorial's services. 81 In mid-2010, PPMH's parent, Phoebe Putney Health System Inc.
("PPHS"), began negotiations with HCA, Inc., for the acquisition of HCA's subsidiary, Palmyra Park Hospital ("Palmyra"). 82 Upon the realization that it would be difficult to find an investment bank to issue a fairness opinion finding the substantial acquisition price was fair, the parties decided to structure the transaction so that the Authority would purchase Palmyra and lease it to PPHS for one dollar per year for forty years. 83 PPHS agreed to guarantee the purchase price and the Authority's performance under the purchase agreement. 84 The Authority held a hearing at which its board members were given minimal time to substantively review the proposal yet 79 ). In addition to the state action doctrine, the district court considered the private parties' immunity under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which is related to the state action doctrine but immunizes from antitrust liability the petitioning of government authorities rather than actions taken pursuant to the direction of the state, and principles of common-law agency. Id. at 1379-80. Further discussion of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine and agency is outside the scope of this paper, as they are not the subject of the FTC's appeal and figure only tangentially in the case. Cir. 1996) , their possession of both public and private characteristics makes it unclear whether such a bright-line rule is appropriate. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 52, at 37. The FTC does not challenge the Authority's status as a political subdivision. Therefore, this Paper assumes arguendo that the Authority is not a private entity that must be actively supervised by the municipality. 128 Although the FTC did not make an active supervision argument concerning the allegedly sham transaction, I argue infra that this issue should be considered under the active supervision prong. In the interest of clarity, I classify this argument as one concerning active supervision. 129 subdivision with ordinary corporate powers does not suffice to authorize it to engage in anticompetitive conduct. Alternatively, the Court might decide that to best preserve principles of federalism, so long as a state authorizes a political subdivision to engage in activities that affect commerce, it may displace competition in the pursuit of its public-interested goals.
2.
Active Supervision
The Court could also consider the issue of active supervision. The Eleventh Circuit did not address the issue whether the merger of PPMH and Palmyra's assets and subsequent lease required active supervision by the Authority over Phoebe Putney. The FTC alleged that the Authority, without meaningful deliberation, "rubberstamped" the proposal for it to acquire Palmyra and lease it to Phoebe Putney; it therefore concluded that state action was altogether absent from the transaction, eliminating the need to determine whether the transaction was immune at all. 131 The absence of meaningful and independent review of the acquisition might indicate Phoebe Putney pursued its private interests in merging with Palmyra. Thus, the Court could use the opportunity to reaffirm Ticor's mandate that supervision be active and meaningful.
However, Omni suggests that judicial inquiry into the intent underlying the Authority's acquisition and lease might be inappropriate. Omni made clear there is no conspiracy exception to the state action doctrine; therefore, the fact that state action is elicited via corruptive means does not render it unforeseeable in light of the fact that making such a determination would constitute judicial overreaching. 132 The Omni Court reasoned that alternative legal avenues are often available to address corruption of the political process. 133 Therefore, it is plausible the Court would hold that the Authority's authorization of the merger-even without meaningful review of whether doing so benefited the public interest-constitutes active supervision. In doing so, it would likely emphasize that antitrust law is inapposite to the complained-of conduct, and in the interest of federalism and judicial restraint, refuse to subject private entities engaging in sham agreements with public authorities to the antitrust laws. Yet another alternative exists.
Courts have refused to subject private entities acting in concert with state entities to the antitrust laws out of concern for tangential attacks on the political process. Phoebe Putney arguably works in concert with the Authority in its lease of state-owned hospitals from it. Therefore, the 136 Under the stricter standard, silence will more often preserve the baseline presumption that competition is the fundamental commercial policy.
Because almost any activity a political subdivision is authorized to engage in might adversely affect competition, the Eleventh Circuit's Phoebe Putney foreseeability standard would require state legislatures to affirmatively foreclose the possibility of state action immunity in order to preserve competition.
Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit's conclusion that the Georgia legislature clearly articulated authorization of competitive harm is flawed. The court stated:
[T]he Georgia legislature must have anticipated anticompetitive harm when it authorized hospital acquisitions by the authorities. It defies imagination to suppose the legislature could have believed that every geographic market in Georgia was so replete with hospitals that authorizing acquisitions by the authorities could have no serious anticompetitive consequences. The legislature could hardly have thought that Georgia's more rural markets could support so many hospitals that acquisitions by an authority would not harm competition. We therefore conclude that, through the Hospital Authorities Law, the Georgia legislature clearly articulated a policy authorizing the displacement of competition.
137
The court's reasoning is flawed because it requires the reviewing court to replace the state's silence with respect to competition policy with an inference that the state must have 135 contemplated competitive concerns because it would be unreasonable not to do so. That inference in the face of silence from the state statute is bolstered by nothing more than the coupling of the fact that seriously anticompetitive transactions are a subset of all transactions with the implicit assumption that legislatures simply do not ever fail to contemplate policies relevant to specific subsets of groups it regulates. Were such an inference a reasonable one in the modern political economy, there would be little need for the state action doctrine. It is unlikely the Supreme Court would sanction such a broad standard that relates so tangentially to the preservation of federalism and grants antitrust immunity so freely. Relying upon Ticor's statement that a state may not "impermissibly 'confer antitrust immunity on private persons by fiat,'" 139 the FTC claims in Phoebe Putney that the Authority merely rubberstamped the private merger and therefore no state action occurred at all. 140 In doing so, it engages in an initial inquiry into whether the merger can be described as state 138 See FTC v. Ticor Title Ins., Co., 504 U.S. 621, 636 (1992); Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 398-99 (1978); ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM'N, supra note 134, at 335. 139 Brief of Appellant, supra note 89, at 28-29; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 102, at 27. The FTC also relied upon other cases explaining the importance of ensuring state involvement in the transactions the state is purported to have authorized. Brief of Appellant, supra note 89, at 29. 140 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 102, at 28; Brief of Appellant, supra note 89, at 43, 44.
action. 141 The Eleventh Circuit disposed of this argument on grounds the FTC sought to inquire into the government's deliberative process, an inquiry prohibited by Omni, 142 which holds corruption in obtaining authorization to displace competition does not render the subsequent anticompetitive activity unforeseeable. Such an inquiry inappropriately questions the government's decisions on when and how to properly oversee state-directed private action.
143
The FTC and the Eleventh Circuit disagreed upon the analytical element under which the complained-of activity-that is, the absence of substantive review over the merger-fell.
It appears both missed the mark. The FTC, in arguing there was no state action involved in the merger between Phoebe Putney and Palmyra, relies upon analysis concerning the second
Midcal prong-active supervision-and not an initial inquiry into whether the state took action at all. 144 The Eleventh Circuit, in rejecting the FTC's argument, relied upon Omni, a case rejecting the theory that corruption in eliciting anticompetitive government action was not foreseeable and thus not clearly authorized under Midcal's first prong. 145 In practical effect, the FTC's argument is one that there was no active supervision over the merger of private hospitals. 146 Because the state action doctrine's overarching goal of preserving principles of federalism cuts against second guessing the motives of public officials generally, Omni's proclamation that judicial inquiry into public officials' intent is inappropriate should apply 141 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 102, at 29 (explaining the court of appeals misunderstood the face that "[t]he FTC's argument, however, went to the antecedent question whether 'the action complained of . . . was that of the State itself . . . ." (first omission in original)).
142 FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 663 F.3d 1369, 1376 n.12 (11th Cir. 2011). 143 Id. 144 E.g., FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 633 (1992); Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 106 (1980) . 145 Phoebe Putney, 663 F.3d at 1376 n.12. 146 Notably, in the active supervision section of its brief to the Eleventh Circuit, the FTC referred back to its original argument that the Authority merely rubberstamped the deal. Compare Brief of Appellant, supra note 89, at 43 ("Here, as discussed above, PPHS, a private actor, was the driving force behind the transaction, for the purpose of gaining a monopoly over acute care hospital services in Albany and the surrounding counties-with the Authority but a strawman, set up by PPHS as the nominal acquirer of Palmyra for the express purpose of evading antitrust scrutiny."), with id. at 27 (" [T] he Authority had no role in negotiating the terms of the purchase. . . .").
equally to Midcal's first and second prongs. Therefore, the proper application of both the FTC and the Eleventh Circuit's rationales is to the active supervision requirement.
The discord highlights a problematic area in which the state has provided for official review but substantive supervision is nonexistent. The FTC's State Action Report stipulates that
Ticor is "helpful in principle [but provides] limited practical benefit" on the standard for determining what constitutes sufficient supervision. 147 Ticor was an extreme case in which there was a clear absence of supervision. 148 "The case therefore did not clarify the standards that would apply to the more ordinary situation in which states have provided some substantive review, but where shortcomings of that review are nevertheless apparent." 149 The report goes on to suggest a "Ticor II" would be useful for setting forth a standard in these more common situations. 150 Phoebe Putney might well be precisely that case.
The Court can resolve the apparent conflict between Ticor and Omni by emphasizing the distinction between the structure of the regulatory regimes at issue in Phoebe Putney and Ticor.
Whereas the regulatory structure in Ticor provided for governmental inaction as the default rule for ratemaking, the regulatory structure in Phoebe Putney provides for a hearing, review, and approval of the Authority's acquisitions and leases. 151 Like Ticor, the post-and-hold law in
Midcal failed to provide for reasonable review of the prices the wholesalers were permitted to set. 152 The judicial active supervision inquiry need not require courts to discern the degree to which a political subdivision supervised private activity. Even if private parties unduly elicited approval of anticompetitive action from a political subdivision, the fact that the political subdivision approved of it without active deliberation should satisfy the active supervision prong.
Assuming Hallie was correct in its conclusion that there is little risk of abuse of competition exemptions by state actors, the benefits of this rule are numerous. As an initial matter, such a rule accords with Supreme Court precedent in Omni without completely abrogating Ticor's requirement that supervision be independent and meaningful. Authorization of anticompetitive conduct is a subset of the vast regulatory capabilities political subdivisions might have. Moreover, the rule is a bright-line one rather than the alternative-a standard inquiring into the degree of supervision that occurred. The rule also preserves principles of federalism because it assumes the governmental entity is subject to political accountability and favors public input over judicial inquiry into politically motivated deliberation. A related benefit is that it requires judicial restraint. These two benefits are likely to reduce error costs, assuming voters are better than courts at holding the government accountable for pursuing the public interest. Additionally, as Omni pointed out, antitrust law may be inapposite to providing a check on political corruption. Finally, the clear articulation prong, if narrowed, would be expected to provide a strong check on political subdivisions authorizing competitively harmful activity.
These benefits weigh in favor of a general rule finding the active supervision prong is satisfied even where the authorization of anticompetitive activity is alleged to be merely nominal. Indeed, public choice theory predicts that special-interest legislation tends to be oversupplied because it narrowly confers benefits to special interest groups while widely distributing the costs on the public at large. 155 The fact that these state laws are enacted at the behest of special interests means the laws are not generally designed with the main purpose of achieving social policy goals.
IV. OTHER ANTITRUST STRATEGIES FOR HANDLING ANTICOMPETITIVE STATE LAWS
A prime example of such state regulation is the post-and-hold law, which Midcal addressed. James Cooper and Professor Joshua Wright conducted a study of the competitive and social effects of post-and-hold laws, and they concluded the laws "have a predictably negative impact on alcohol consumption, but no measurable effect on drunk driving accidents and various themselves capable of self-regulation. 167 Carstensen explains that the more local the level of governments, the less informed scrutiny there is and the greater the risk there is "that public intervention in the market will be excessive, misguided, and unquestioned." 168 It is therefore unclear, if not unlikely, that a hospital authority has the incentive to pursue public-interested goals. As discussed above, the FTC's State Action Report finds that political subdivisions other than municipalities often possess both public and private characteristics. 169 It recommends consideration on a case-by-case basis whether a political subdivision whose actions are being challenged must satisfy the active supervision prong of Midcal.
170
The Antitrust Modernization Commission suggests a tiered approach to active supervision of political subdivisions. 171 Under this approach, the amount of supervision required depends upon "the type of conduct at issue, the entity engaging in that conduct, the industry, the regulatory scheme, and other factors." 172 Care should be taken in implementing this approach, as the potential exists for courts to overreach in determining the intent and subjective beliefs of the public officials who are charged with supervising the conduct at issue. It is possible to separate tiers according to the type of oversight required (e.g., rate setting versus approval of proposed rates) without inquiring into officials' intent.
Carstensen suggests there is a place for more active involvement in protecting competition by state attorneys general. 173 For example, state attorney general offices can create competition advocacy components within them. 174 The competition advocacy units would be responsible for overseeing legislation, regulations, and local ordinances likely to impact competition. 175 They would then be able to provide analysis of the competitive effects of those laws and advocate on behalf of competition when they identify unnecessarily anticompetitive methods of implementing state policies. 176 Carstensen also suggests that attorneys general become more actively involved in litigation challenging anticompetitive government conduct. 177 They can either initiate the litigation or stand on the side of private parties challenging unreasonable regulation. purpose of using superior expertise to guide national competition policy. 179 Susan Creighton and Thomas Krattenmaker have suggested section 5 enforcement can be expanded to encompass challenges to state-imposed competitive harm. 180 They suggest that the state action doctrine might not apply to the FTCA as it applies to the Sherman Act. 181 Therefore, the FTC may have the ability to pursue anticompetitive state action that private plaintiffs are currently unable to challenge. The D.C. Circuit has rejected the argument, finding no indication in the legislative history of the FTCA that Congress intended to grant the FTC the authority to challenge state laws that conflict with the antitrust laws. 182 The Supreme Court has never made a definitive proclamation on the issue. In Ticor, it raised the prospect that the Commission might not be barred by the state action doctrine, but the Court quickly declined to opine on the issue because the FTC did not assert superior preemption authority in the case. 183 Professors Areeda and Hovenkamp are skeptical of an argument that the FTC is not barred by the state action doctrine. 184 They acknowledge that arguments in favor of expanded section 5 enforcement exist. 185 The availability of less draconian remedial action in the form of cease and desist orders rather than criminal penalties or treble damages is the most obvious benefit. 186 Additionally, the FTC's composition and jurisdiction provide it with the incentives to pursue the public interest rather than private interests. 187 The FTC also has the ability to monitor postenforcement results. 188 Finally, the FTC possesses rulemaking authority, so it would be permitted to promulgate a rule addressing general policies. 189 Areeda and Hovenkamp remain unpersuaded by the benefits accompanying expanded section 5 authority, however. 190 They find no statement in the FTCA's legislative history indicating congressional intent to enable the FTC to challenge state-imposed restraints.
191
Unless Congress amends the FTCA in a way that permits the Commission to challenge state-imposed anticompetitive conduct, it is unlikely the FTC can pursue the option. FTC Chairman Jon Leibowitz has been active in advocating for congressional intervention in areas he has identified as warranting greater antitrust scrutiny. 192 If Congress is receptive to expanding the FTC's authority, Chairman Leibowitz or others seeking such an expansion may be able to convince them.
CONCLUSION
State laws that displace competition in favor of alternative regulatory regimes aimed at public-interested goals pose a unique threat to state and national commercial policies of free competition. Additionally, principles of federalism weigh in favor of permitting states to experiment with regulatory regimes without the threat of antitrust challenge. The state action doctrine seeks to address the tension between promoting federalism principles and preserving competition. However, judicial application of the doctrine has become muddled, resulting in the risk that neither goal is pursued. Phoebe Putney presents an opportunity for the Supreme Court to clarify the doctrine. The Court should heighten the standard for determining whether a state policy displacing competition has been clearly articulated. Further, it should clarify that courts determining whether a state actively supervises implementation of its policies should refrain from opining on the appropriateness of public officials' supervision, instead determining whether the state has provided for adequate supervision of private activity taken pursuant to state policy.
Options for more adequate application of the state action doctrine are not limited to Supreme Court intervention. Alternatives exist that allow lower courts and Congress to direct the doctrine's application toward the dual goals of serving principles of federalism and preserving competition.
